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Abstract
We use a systemic process model of continual change to examine patterns of continuity and
discontinuity in the policy processing systems of four auto insurance companies. The model
draws on theories of deep structure, inertia and punctuated equilibrium. It demonstrates how
variation across the units of an organization resulting from diversity in local competitive
environments, coupled with continual changes, creates emergent and dynamic patterns of
influence at the unit and organizational system level that complicate the innovation diffusion
process. Field research using historical methods for data collection enabled us to trace the
development of each organizationâs primary processing system back to its beginnings and
provided substantive support for the oscillations that organizations face as they struggle with
the tension between the need to innovate and the complexity that results. The model provides
a sensitizing lens that reveals the tensions between the need to differentiate products to
address local competitive needs and the role of standards, which enable units to more easily
share existing processes and to adopt wholesale system changes en mass.
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To date, most implementation studies have examined the success of an information 
system by its acceptance and use at its completion. But if systems are to be utilized as sustainable 
resources that support the development and delivery of future products and services, then 
researchers must extend their research to include capabilities for future enhancements. 
We develop a process model to describe change as it unfolds in systems over time. We 
view change as a continual occurrence in systems, planned by organizations or improvised by 
individuals and sometimes resulting from the unexpected consequences of one or both.    
Cumulative changes define current conditions and the requirements for and constraints inhibiting 
future change.  
We begin by describing the theoretical underpinnings of our model. Then we describe the 
model itself and the historical field study.  Next, we describe our findings and finally, we discuss 





Inertia results when adaptation and refinement of processes and procedures, used to 
further the exploitation of current strategy, reduce an organization’s ability to change in non-
continuous ways. Deep structures (Gersick 1991) arise from the interrelationship of components 
of a system1 and the way they work together to maintain organization consistency (Tushman and 
Romanelli 1985). Over time, a system will move toward stability for two reasons. First, each 
choice made during a system’s implementation and evolution will limit the realm of possible 
choices for its future. Second, the patterns of activity that take place within the system’s deep 
structures reinforce that course. Occasionally, organizations will be forced to make 
discontinuous changes as the buildup of inertia reduces their ability to execute incrementally.  
The theory of punctuated equilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli 1985) combines inertia 
and discontinuous change. It rejects the notion that systems of the same type must follow the 
same patterns or stages of development2. Rather, conflicting theories of adaptation and rigidity 
might both be applicable to the same system at different times. The organizing principles of a 
system change during its life cycle, so no one universal motivating driver can be used to explain 
its evolutionary progress. Punctuated equilibrium enables the identification of common 
categories of choices and the identification of a system’s state, but it also allows for infinite 
variety in the way that events occur in individual systems.  
Variation also plays a role in the evolution of systems that support multiple business 
units. It is conceptualized as a systemic attribute of systems, resulting from the differing 
responses of business units to their individual environments. As units seek to enhance their 
                                                     
1 System refers to the relations among the attributes of entities that achieve a particular output.  It is not limited to 
information technology. 
 
2 E.g., Lewin’s (1951) freeze, change and refreeze Ginzberg’s (1981) adaptation of the Kolb and Frohman (1970) 
model and Rogers (1995) evaluation, adoption and implementation. 
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degree of fit with their environments, their products, services, processes and routines come to 
vary widely in design and execution. These variations contribute to the performance of 
individual units and therefore, to the organization’s performance overall. 
To accommodate punctuated equilibrium and variation and to understand the nature of 
continual change, we need a model that is neither linear nor rigid. We need to represent how an 
organization would change as a system is implemented across multiple units. We also need to 
show what would happen when a major revision is carried out, and a second, and a third. 
Cause and effect relationships are often disguised by the passage of time and the 
continual nature of change. By using a cause map to illustrate change, we uncover those 
relationships and demonstrate the development and destruction of deep structure during periods 
of evolutionary and revolutionary change in organizations. Cause maps reveal the results of 
repeated patterns of interaction through feedback loops. They show the iterative and cyclical 
relationships that affect system components, even when they are separated by the passage of time 
and intervening events, and even if some of the effects do not become apparent until multiple 




The Continual Change Model 
 
The process of implementing an information system across an organization results in its 
adaptation to meet the needs of the business units that use it (Barley 1986). Even after 
implementation is complete, people will continue to refine their practices as they learn to solve 
problems with the new technology and processes (Orlikowski 1996). Implementations in 
individual units differ because of unique interpretations of requirements (Cooper and Zmud 
1990), varying environmental factors (George and King 1991), and the idiosyncrasies of the 
units themselves. Variation is the accumulated result of different units adapting the fit of their 
system to the requirements of their regulatory or competitive environments. Hence, the greater 
the number of units, the more variation across the organization. Increased levels of variation 
resulting from the adaptation of an innovation across units of an organization yield better 
performance, at least in the short term. 
Over time, however, variation has inertial affects. As a new system becomes the resource 
into which future innovations must be incorporated, adaptations made to a system’s design 
during one implementation will influence the degree of change necessary to implement 
subsequent innovations. Therefore, increased levels of variation across units decrease the ease 
with which future change can be carried out. Reciprocally, reduction in variation facilitates an 
increase in the magnitude of the next change. An oscillation between easier and more difficult 
changes is the inevitable result.  
Figure 1 portrays how the relationships among performance, perceived need for change 
and the ease with which change can occur are all influenced by the level of variation across the 
units in a system. The magnitude of any future change will be dependent on the level of 
influence of both the perceived need for change and the ease with which changes can be made. 
The level of variation in the system as measured across the units of the organization will be 
influenced by the magnitude of the change, since it will determine the number and breadth of 
opportunities the units have for variation. Opportunities for variation will emerge during 
implementation of an innovation into a unit of the organization, so the greater the number of 
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units, the greater the potential for variation. Since the magnitude of each change implemented in 
the system will vary, the occurrence of any single evolutionary iteration may or may not result in 
a significant level of influence over other components of the system. However, the systemic 
causal relations between evolutionary change and subsequent variation will eventually influence 
decisions to adopt new products and services through the perception of need and the ability to 
change. Eventually, the need for change to accommodate internal or external forces may require 
a revolutionary change to alter the organization’s deep structures in a way that will reduce 































Figure 1.  Model of Continual Change. 
 
 
The model contains competing loops that oscillate according to the strength of opposing 
influences. For instance, if a significant new product were diffused across many units within an 
organization, a great degree of variation in the systems that support that product would be 
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ability to make changes in the future. With increased performance, there is less perceived need 
for change.  This, coupled with a decreased ability to change, should reduce the magnitude of 
future change. Over time, however, the lack of innovation within the organization will result in 
poorer performance and an increase in the perceived need for innovation. Because of the inertia 
resulting from previous variation and change, eventually a discontinuous change will be 
required.  This discontinuity will create a large correction that reduces variation and increases the 





We employed interpretive field research (Klein and Myers 1999) using historical 
methods for data collection (Mason, et al 1997) to examine the evolution of systems in four 
multi-unit organizations. To do so, we traced the development of each organization’s primary 
processing system back to its beginnings, thereby allowing for a sufficient passage of time to 
establish the origin of path dependencies (Mason, et al, 1997). Historical methods provide a rich 
backdrop for the circumstances in which organizations operate and decisions are made. As an 
idiographic research methodology, history stresses the uniqueness of an organizational setting. 
Historical analysis also lends itself to the application of nomothetic methods as a way to frame 
and compare the causal nature of events. These methods offer the ability to evaluate evolutionary 
models by observing patterns of events (Kieser 1994).  
We followed the seven-step process for historical analysis outlined by Mason, et al 
(1997) for gathering and evaluating the evidence. First we developed a timeline. Primary sources 
included forty-nine interviews with current and past employees and archival documentation. All 
interviews were taped and transcribed for subsequent analysis.  Secondary sources included 
industry news, annual reports and published case studies of the organizations. All data were 
collected in the first half of 2001. Next, events were verified through further interviews and 
document collection. Finally, patterns were analyzed to evaluate how events produced effects 
leading to subsequent events.  
The study examined a single industry to ensure environmental control. Auto insurance 
provided ideal industry characteristics. Because it is regulated at the state level in the U.S., it 
offers an industry whose products are sold across multiple units with a variety of information 
requirements and product design limitations. Companies can pick and choose states in which to 
compete, altering the complexity of the regulatory issues and mix of competitors.  
Cases were selected to demonstrate predictability with similar or contrary results (Yin 
1988). Since the model theorizes that the number of business units contributes to variation, 
companies with national and regional presence were both selected. Companies were also chosen 
according to the historical origin of their product: standard or non-standard. Standard 
underwriting uses information about an insured as a gate-keeping method, allowing for the 
remaining risks to be priced using a simplified and standardized set of variables. Non-standard 
companies choose to accept customers regardless of risk, but price them appropriately in order to 
insure profitability. Such differences have implications for data collection, underwriting, pricing 
and perceptions regarding the need for change. Four organizations enabled us to examine each 
situation (Table 1) and are generally considered adequate for achieving theoretical saturation 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
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 Regional reach National reach 
Standard insurance Alpha Omega 
Non-standard insurance Beta Delta 





Alpha    
Alpha is the most conservative of the four carriers and competes in the fewest number of 
states. Marketing its products only in Midwest states through a network of captive agents has 
helped Alpha carry out a product strategy based on consistency and an approach to system 
design that emphasizes uniformity and standards. To achieve adequate market share in these 
states, Alpha expanded its products to include non-standard auto in the 1980s. Just recently, the 
company broke with tradition by aggressively expand its geographic scope and updating its 
product designs. The company now finds that their ability to deliver new products and services 
as fast as it would like has become constrained by the current design of its processing systems, 
although it currently has no plans to replace it. 
 
Beta 
In contrast, Beta began as a non-standard company and quickly expanded its geographic 
scope. Initially the company expanded into twelve states, selling through independent agents. It 
then merged with another small non-standard carrier that had grown in a similar fashion, except 
this company also sold direct to customers through retail stores and call centers. In contrast to 
Alpha’s focus on developing a strong market share in a few states, Beta, as a non-standard niche 
player, needed to expand across more states in order to grow in terms of total written premium.  
Beta has attempted to keep pace with most of the new product innovations that have 
emerged in the last fifteen years. It has remained strictly in the non-standard market. The 
company has periodically had to replace parts of its computerized systems in order to restructure 
its design, thereby regaining some flexibility lost during the rapid succession of cumulative 
changes that accompanied its expansions. Today, the company is again facing serious constraints 
to its ability to accommodate change to its processing systems. It hopes to replicate past success, 
Beta is once again replacing major portions of its policy processing system.  
 
Delta 
Delta also began with a non-standard product. But, unlike Beta, Delta has long competed 
nationally and has recently expanded its offerings to include a standard product.  For Delta, 
continual innovation has resulted in many product changes and much success, but it has also 
created the need to frequently reengineer and replace parts of its policy systems. The changes in 
product have also accompanied changes in marketing and service design as the company has 
expanded into different delivery channels, now selling direct through call centers and on-line, in 
addition to existing networks of independent agents and strategic partners.  
 
Omega 
Omega also competes nationally, but its mission until recently was primarily to support 
its captive life agents with a complimentary auto product. Omega has not expanded the scope of 
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its product design beyond standard underwriting until just last year. The product has changed 
very little, mostly due to Omega’s indifference to product line and its inability to invest in 
information technology. In recent years, a change in management brought about a turnaround 
effort at Omega. The company rapidly expanded the number of channels used to distribute its 
products and moved quickly to develop a more competitive product. To date, the aging and 
increasingly inert processing systems have inhibited the organization’s ability to implement its 





 Table 2 and Figure 2 both show the timelines of change for each organization. The 
timelines in Table 2 document the change events. Figure 2 delineates periods of incremental and 
discontinuous movements in the trajectory of each system’s evolution. Incremental events 
include expansion or enhancement of the system’s functionality through more automation. 
Discontinuous events mark changes that replaced, reengineered or redesigned existing parts of a 
system. Both incremental and discontinuous changes accompany changes to the company’s 
operations, but with few exceptions, discontinuities became necessary in order to support 
changes to products or services. In each case, the existing system had become too inflexible to 
accommodate the desired change.  
These classifications of events differ significantly by the level of effort required both 
technologically and organizationally, as in discontinuous changes existing data and work 
processes must be transformed. They also differ in terms of cost and the degree of risk; therefore 
discontinuous change efforts are justifiably avoided by management. Figure 2 documents similar 
patterns of oscillation among the organizations, yet strikingly different degrees to which 
discontinuous changes were undertaken.  
While each of these organizations must continually make changes to its product designs 
to accommodate the evolving nature of regulatory rules, industry competition and information 
technology, they experienced very different degrees of discontinuity over the last two decades. 
To analyze the patterns and test the ability of the model to explain the differing patterns of 
change and their trajectories, we first compare the evolution of the systems based on the nature 
of their products. Then we compare them based on the number of units they support. 
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Year Alpha Beta Delta Omega 
1980 Original policy systems  Original policy system Original policy system 
1981     
1982   System reconfigured into 
four virtual regions – 
enables growth 
 
1983    Agent reporting system – 
provides activity  analysis 
1984     
1985 New policy system –
supports growth 
Original policy system    
1986 Agent system  - provides 
remote sales processing 
 System reconfigured 
into 12 divisions - 
supports variation 
New print and mail 
systems  
1987 Document system –print 
automation 
   
1988 Rewrite policy system – 
add non-standard  
 Agent rating disk  
1989     
1990    Agent system - provides 
automated rating 
1991 Automate billing system     
1992 New agent system – move 
to PC technology 
Initial agents system – 
support rating 
Pilot system –standard 
product 
New policy system 
cancelled - limited 
resources  
1993  Replace database – 
enables state expansion 
Rewrite policy system –
standard product 
New rating engine –more 
efficient rating  
1994   New direct sales system   
1995  Replace policy system – 
enables state expansion 
New internet sales system  Automated renewals 
processing  
1996 Integration of customer 
billing across products 
 Rewrite agent disk –
support new rating 
model 
 
1997 New policy system 
cancelled – too complex 
 Replace policy db – 
support new data 
requirements 
 
1998 Update rating engine   Rewrite direct system 
Rewrite internet system  
 
1999  Replace agent rating  
system – support sales 
across channels 
Rewrite print system – 
standardize to enable 
change 
Replace agent system –
greater data capabilities 
for underwriting 
2000  Rewrite policy system - 
expansion into new 
channels 
 Replace policy system – 
enables new products 
Replace database – 
enables new products 
2001   Replace billing system – 
enable new products  
 
Table 2.  Italics: incremental changes; bold: discontinuous change 
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Standard Products  
 
Alpha.  Alpha’s underwriting focus is risk avoidance, so it makes use of simple data 
models to price and process policies. Except for the addition of a non-standard auto product in 
1988 (see Figure 2A), new product designs were unheard of until a tiered product was introduced 
last year. Yet, over time the systems have evolved as changes were made to refine existing 
products and processes. Today, the company finds that the structures of the systems are very 
difficult to change which is making it difficult to deploy new products. 
The infrequency of significant change and the effect that has had on system structures 
and organizational performance is in part explained by the company’s overall product strategy. 
As the organization remained singularly focused on in-state growth and conservatively followed 
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little energy in the organization to undertake discontinuous change, even though it might have 
offered an opportunity for renewal. Only in recent years, as performance has been adversely 
affected by regional concentration of risks and low policy retention due to increased competition 
form more innovative products have new products been developed. And only then did 
management realize how inert the systems had become. To date, Alpha has introduced its new 
products only in states in which it has not previously competed because constraints within its 
policy processing systems required the segregation of new products from existing ones. 
 
Omega.  Originally, Omega was first and foremost a life insurance company; the purpose of 
the auto product was to provide a compliment or loss leader for life products. Management was 
concerned only with maintaining the existing products and systems and had little interest in 
innovation. This became increasingly the case as the old system became more and more difficult to 
change, which further stifled adaptation to changing market conditions.  Not surprisingly, 
performance declined. The auto organization’s demand for change was never great enough to alter 
this trajectory.  
In the model, the absence of change is explained by the relationship between performance 
and the perceived need for change. In this case, poorly aligned measures of performance coupled 
with inadequate resources to update the system prevented a discontinuous response. The poor 
performance was tolerated and the system was allowed to continue deteriorating. In recent years, 
perceptions have changed. New management has led the pursuit of innovative new product designs 
and new systems to support them (see Figure 2D 1999, 2000). The obstacles the organization now 
faces are explained by the buildup of inert structures over time which have reduced the ability to 
change. As a result, the development of the new product has prompted the replacement of the entire 




Beta.  In terms of innovation, Beta is a fast follower in the non-standard auto market.  
Beta frequently examines competitor products as well as its own in order to make adjustments, 
enhancements and quite often completely redesign them. Each time a major competitor 
introduces an innovation, Beta follows, creating systems that are complex and often difficult to 
manage. To keep pace with competitors, Beta has had to periodically reprogram and even replace 
significant parts of its systems. This has allowed them to re-organize their system to increase the 
flexibility in design options they offer to the product managers.  
This recurring pattern of change (see Figure 2B) is explained in the model by the 
organization’s perceptions of change and the continual update of its products and systems. The 
large oscillations in the patterns of change are influenced by the perceived need to develop and 
implement new ideas. Ultimately, when change becomes constrained, the perceived need for 
change then supports and encourages even larger changes that are required to restructure or 
replace the current system, creating a large discontinuous change. These events improve the 
ability to change in the short run. But the unrelenting pace of change ultimately results in more 
variation across the products as subsequent enhancements are adopted.  
 
Delta.  Delta has always had a reputation as an innovator, which includes its use of data, its 
pricing methods and its technology. Many ideas have come from product managers who identify 
local opportunities for new products. Delta’s product managers historically embarked on 
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independent paths of innovation and product development. Experimentation paid off and the 
company grew and prospered, but systems became increasingly incompatible. As the company 
recognized its inability to share innovations across units and to quickly diffuse new products across 
multiple states, uniformity of products became the objective.  
Eventually the products were aligned, making innovation diffusion more efficient. However, 
the lack of new product ideas resulted in a return to a belief about the need for innovation. Today, 
Delta is again allowing product managers to make innovative changes unilaterally. The model 
explains these oscillations by examining the dynamic tension between the need for local innovation 
and the ability to implement change across a system. The strong drive for product innovation 
increases variation, boosting performance, but it also makes change more difficult.  
 
 
Number of Units 
 
The number of business units also played an important role in the evolution of each 
system. Each organization has faced challenges coordinating implementation efforts across and 
between units. When a company increases the number of states in which it competes, it must 
contend with a greater variety of regulatory rules and a greater number and variety of 
competitors. The difference in the products offered by these competitors often requires different 
competitive responses in the design of a product.  
 
Regional Reach  
 
Alpha.  Alpha has less variation across its units than the other companies because it 
markets in fewer states and the states in which it does compete have less diversity of 
requirements.  Alpha has also dictated standards across all states and has accommodated 
exceptions through manual processing. Over time, however, Alpha has continued to refine its 
products and processes, adding more underwriting rules and continually automating more policy 
processing. The result is an increasingly refined system based on the standard product designs 
and processes. The complementary result is variation in processing procedures. Alpha now finds 
it increasing difficulty to implement change because of a standardized system that cannot 
accommodate a deviation in product design and widely diverse work processes and procedures 
that make it very difficult to incorporate the requirements of new states.  
Now that Alpha is implementing a new product design it finds it can only do so by 
introducing it in states where they have not competed in the past. This expedites implementation 
by avoiding existing structures, but increases variation, both in the automated and manual 
systems.  
The model explains the inertial effects that Alpha is experiencing. Small changes are the 
norm, so when larger changes are requested, they result in implementation delays and manual 
workarounds. This contributes to variation in the system as different units employ different and 
distinct products and processes, which become an obstacle to changing the system in the future.  
 
Beta.  Beta’s strategy for growth has focused on adding states and expanding its geographic 
reach. Early in its history, state expansion and product changes were constrained by limitations in 
the system. As the company expanded, it faced new and increasingly difficult challenges in 
designing its products to accommodate significant differences in the design requirements for new 
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states. As a result, variation increased with the addition of more states. As the system became 
increasingly inflexible, innovation and growth became stifled, which affected performance. The 
company replaced its database (see Figure 2B 1993), then its quoting system  (see Figure 2B 1995) 
to provide greater flexibility. Since that time, the programmers at Beta have worked hard to build 
systems that will accommodate change.  
The model explains that changes of a larger magnitude across more states combine to 
create increasing levels of variation in a system. As perceptions of need continued to fuel 
change, the IS department focused on building flexible designs and improving their ability to 
change. But again the system has restricted the organization’s ability to respond to its changing 
needs. The current rewrite  (see Figure 2B 2000) once again exemplifies a discontinuous change 




Delta.  The strategy at Delta was to identify and capitalize on local knowledge of a state, 
resulting in a great deal of explicit variation. Later, systems were regionalized to make processing 
units more efficient and then divisionalized to allow programmers to acquire and leverage 
knowledge of specific states. The variation across products in the current system contributed to the 
performance of individual units and the company’s overall aggregate performance, but it also created 
obstacles to change. That realization brought about efforts to reengineer the systems (see Figure 2C 
1993) in conjunction with four successive rollouts of an increasingly standardized product.  
Today, the products and systems at Delta are more standardized than ever and the 
organization has become very efficient at delivering changes, in part by reducing variation. But, now 
the organization feels a need to become more innovative, so it is allowing units to evolve 
independently.  
These patterns are explained in the model. By reducing the level of variation in the system, 
Delta was able to execute changes more efficiently. Delta then recognized that high levels of 
standardization in a world of diverse regulations and competitors adversely affects performance. As 
explained in the model, performance requires the ability to accommodate local needs, which in 
aggregate yields increasing levels of variation.  
 
Omega.  As discussed above, the strategy at Omega focused on providing a 
complementary product. Over the course of time, however, the mix of business rules and aging 
code resulting from incremental changes made the systems increasingly complex and inert. 
Thereafter, variation became more prevalent as the inability to implement change led to diffusing 
new products and services selectively to states where changes met the least resistance or where 
the impact to performance was greatest. This method of prioritization contributed to increasing 
variation across the forty-seven states and to decreasing the ability to change.  
Omega’s situation exemplifies variation’s dualistic role in a system. Omega was able to 
increase performance by delivering change to its states, and as change became more difficult, 
Omega became increasingly selective. Adding an enhancement to some states and not others 
introduced more variation. Now the perceived need for a new product is driving the 
implementation of a new system. Yet, practices of selective diffusion persist because of the 
short-term benefits to performance, despite any long-term cost to flexibility. 
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Discussion 
 
 The model explains the emergence of oscillating patterns of change in a system created 
by the need to alter the products and services it supports over time. An important component of 
the model is the degree to which variation emerges as a systemic variable, its ability to contribute 
to performance and the degree to which it may constrain the ability to change the system in the 
future. Since variation emerges across multiple units in a system, diversity in the number of units 
that an organization serves provides one way to examine the model’s robustness and its ability to 
explain patterns of change.  
Additionally, the model takes into account how change influences management’s 
perceptions about the evaluation of performance and the need for future change. This component 
concerns the choices managers make about where and how to compete and influences how 
products are designed and marketed over time. Comparing companies that have chosen to 
compete differently based on their product designs provides a way to examine the theory’s 
ability to explain the dynamics of change in the systems of these four organizations. 
In the two standard companies, the way in which performance was measured and the way 
changes were perceived slowed the evolution of systems and thereby dampened the oscillating 
cycles of change. Yet, these organizations still experienced an inability to change because of the 
levels of variation across their state product designs. Changes accumulated over time to form 
increasingly complex structures both in the design of the products and the processes that 
supported them. Once perceptions about change were altered and the organizations moved to 
implement new products or to expand their presence to additional states, the inert state of their 
systems became noticeable. Large changes, such as replacing a policy processing system, are 
discontinuous changes, which break from the current trajectory of the system and reduce inertia, 
making future changes easier.  
In contrast, the perceptions of performance in the non-standard companies promoted 
change. The dynamics of their industry promoted and rewarded innovation, which led to using 
more and different data. Together, the complexity of the systems, combined with the dynamics 
of constant change in products and services, brought about continual changes in the systems at 
both companies. These dynamics sped the environmental cycles of continuous and discontinuous 
change in the systems, making variation across the units a critical factor in the success of their 
products. But, in both organizations, variation in the system in combination with the dynamics 
and magnitude of change, created significant barriers to implementing change, which led to 





In this study, the size of the organizations and the nature of their product market 
strategies were used to evaluate the dynamics of change. The analysis demonstrates the value of 
the model, in explaining how the number of units in a system will influence the level of variation 
and the subsequent ability of an organization to implement change. It also explains how the 
orientation of the products and services supported by a system influences its development and 
the demand for changes to it. A niche market strategy and the perceived need to change product 
designs were shown to create larger oscillations in the patterns of inertia and change. Conversely, 
stability in a product and the perceptions regarding performance also influenced the patterns of 
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change, resulting in long periods of incremental change and adaptation that caused inertia over 
time. 
 This research expands our understanding of diffusion, implementation and information 
systems change research by modeling the dynamic interaction of events that set the stage for 
future change. For practitioners it provides a model of change that lends insight into the 
distributed and delayed effects of change. These effects manifest themselves by inhibiting 
change, but go unnoticed until change is most desired and least accessible.  
IS researchers have examined resistance to change as an obstacle to successful 
implementations, but have not examined sources of structural inertia that are used to explain 
obstacles to organizational adaptation. An important question for future research is how 
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